Editors note: This story was originally published in the September 1966 issue of MotorTrend, with the historic battle between Ford and Ferrari having taken place in June of that same year. To celebrate the upcoming film Ford V Ferrari, we thought wed dig through our archives. This deep dive into the herculean effort that went into that Ford win by Griff Borgeson is what we found. Make sure to check out our review of the Ford V Ferrari film here . And find out what we learned about the win from Ford's archives here . 24 HOURS TO END THEM ALL Ford only hoped to win Le Mans, not to go down in history as the perpetual holder of its all-time performance records. Ford lucked into that distinction when the organizers of the 24 Hour Race announced the regulation which will apply in 1967, revealing them just two days before this year's event. In the future the 24 Heures du Mans promises to be essentially a contest for modified stock cars, with speeds held down by alterations of the course and by fuel consumption limits which are overwhelmingly in favor of small displacement cars such as the Alpine. With mounting government concern for public safetyand the 24 hours is run on public roadsthis had to come. Having come, it seems certain to spell the end of a hairy and heroic age for this classic contest of them all. Thus, when our children's children read of the glories of the Le Mans that was, they will find Ford at the pinnacle of those 34 Grands Prix d'Endurance and of courage, determination, and achievement. Le Mans Enzo called it The Steam Roller, thereby almost conceding defeat. Others called it The Ford Armada. The European press exulted the intercontinental conflict to the limit. Some Europeans resented the invaders for assorted reasons and let them know it. While the general public just waxed more enthusiastic over the battle of giants that was to come. But everyone expected an American victory. Unfortunately, from many standpoints, Enzo seemed to think so, too. He had other problems but his worst handicap probably was that he was thoroughly psyched. It was in early 1963 that Ford began negotiating to buy into Ferrari. According to Enzo there were to be two divisions: Ferrari-Ford, of which he would own 90 percent and would be devoted exclusively to racing, and Ford-Ferrari, of which he would own 10 percent and which would carry on the production-car side of the business. The deal bogged down, according to Enzo, when it became clear that he would be no more than a puppet even in his division. According to a Ford spokesman, it bogged down when it became clear that Enzo wanted to trade even, meaning that his bargaining demands became unreasonable, which would be entirely in character. In any case, before the bubble burst completely there was a solid month during which a parade of FoMoCo administrative and technical experts explored every nook, cranny, and aspect of the until-then secret kingdom for which Ford was dickering. When they left, they knew more about Enzo's operation than he knew himself. Intentionally or not, the rampant Horse of Maranello had been had by the Trojan Horse of Dearborn. This is where the poker game, or war, started getting lost. Enzo began predicting openly an American takeover in races for the FIA Manufacturers' Championship. Of course, he expected Ford to enter this arena with full race DOHC engines and not with the basically production engines with which Ford chose to beat him. Demoralized, he was badly prepared for Ford's Le Mans campaign in '65, but by the grace of Ford's own even worse preparation and some good, independently entered Ferraris, the race was his for the sixth running year. But the failure of his own P2's exposed his weakness and, he knew, could only fire Ford with new confidence. Then the old fox really began outfoxing himself. First he stated that there would be no factory cars at Le Mans in '66a stunt that hardly anyone took seriously. Then he said that there would be onemerely one new four-liter DOHC P3. Then, for reasons of strategy and secrecy, or simply because he was not ready, he did not send a car to the April practice, confining his testing to certain Italian circuits. And this does not tell you all you need to know about how a car will perform at Le Mans. Then, scant days before the race, he surprised everyone by producing three P3's, one of which was entered under the aegis of Nart-Chinetti. Counting the three two-liter Dinos and the private entries, 14 Ferraris started the race. I asked Dragoni, the Milanese cosmetics manufacturer who is Enzo's racing manager, the reason for the conflicting statements about P3. These cars cost a lot to build, he said. Much more than a F1 car, just because of the endurance that has to be built into them. At first the Commendatore's budget would only cover the construction of one car. Then the money became available to build a second and a third. That's all. The fact that the Agnelli dynasty attended the race was generally interpreted as reflecting the patronage of Ferrari. Even under favorable conditions there almost never is time for the completion of race cars. The P3's were started very late, seemingly as an 11 th -hour decision. Then a long series of strikes, which are part of the Italian way of life, robbed Enzo of a priceless day or two a week for weeks on end. Morale often is none too high in the incredibly autocratic atmosphere of the Maranello plant, and this deflated it further. Fear of Ford, based on Sebring, Daytona and infinite rumors contributed to drive morale to a low. The word around Modena and Maranello was that the many people in the Ferrari organization were praying for a Ford victory at Le Mans just to get the damned suspense over with and to have a clearly defined new target to shoot at. Then, to send morale underground, there were the worse-than-usual Machiavellian machinations with drivers: Ferraris top F1 driver, John Surtees, was so badly injured last fall that for some time it was doubtful that he would be able to walk again, much less race. So in December Enzo, supposedly bereft of any top F1 talent, dropped a bomb at his annual press conference. He already had, in casa, an F1 driver to trim them all. This was none other than his test engineer and ace sports prototype driver Mike Parkes. Mike would replace Surtees in F1 and would continue his other duties as well. In fact, one of the new three-liter F1 machines was being tailored to Mikes towering frame. Parkes believed what he heard and was euphoric. Then, to the amazement of all, including the medical profession, and by superhuman effort, Surtees healed himself and was back in top form for the start of the '66 season. Enzo has a rule that there is room for only one rooster to any hencoop. So Surtees was put back in the number one F1 driver's seat and Parkes was put back into F1 oblivion. But the personality buildups and teardowns during this period were not forgotten. Surtees drove in five races, won three of them, and was formally entered for Le Mans, sharing one of the new P3's with Parkes. Then, two days before the race, Dragoni informed Surtees that much-lesser driver Scarfiotti was being given his ride but that he could hang around and take over in case either became indisposed. Surtees did not take kindly to this public degradation, but Dragoni told him to take it or lump it, which he did, with bad blood teaming like Lambrusco on both sides. This was just some of the grit in Ferrari's crankcase. When the 24 Hours began and the three Dinos all conked out within the first 80 miles, there was not much spirit left in the camp. But the capper was the race strategy. This called for driving to last and for never actually engaging the Fords in a race, based on the hope that they would eliminate themselves. The P3's were about as fast as the Fords, perfectly stable, had perfect brakes, were 660 pounds (!) lighter, had to consume less fuel, and make fewer refueling stops. By missing the April practice they managed to arrive with sets of gears just over and just under these which would have been right for the course. True, all were out of the race by the 10th hour, two due to transmission failure (which other gears might have postponed), and the other due to Scarfiotti's crash (which Surtees might have avoided). Still, the waiting-game strategy was severely criticized. Out of the eight Fords, three had survived, and none were pushed. If one P3 Ferrari had been sacrificed and ordered to go flat-out until it broke, what would this have done to the Fords? Might not the other two P3's, stroking in the rear, have been able to finish well? To salvage some glory from what otherwise was a rout, and perhaps even to win? Had everything been done rationally a P3 victory would have been perfectly possible. But Ferrari was beaten before the race started, and not only by Ford. Is this how a giant, a genius and demon goes over the hill? Probably. Fords strategy Ferrari's strategy may have been misguided but Ford's became downright unpalatable to that part of the world that possesses a sporting sense. Three of the eight cars were assigned to Shelby American, three to Holman, Moody & Stroppe, and two to Alan Mann, an Englishman with a brilliant record in racing and rallying, using Ford products. Each car had its pair of drivers and its team of mechanics. The total personnel consisted of racing men and there was the old instinctive rivalry between the equipped, the teams of drivers, and the teams of mechanics. Each of the latter worked intensely hard, each trying to outdo the other in having the best-prepared car. The Ford Mark II engines peak at about 6,200 rpm and orders were given not to exceed 6,100. On Thursday's practice Ken Miles smashed Phil Hill's existing record of 138.360 mph (set in '65 with a Mark II prototype) with a searing lap at 142.151. Gurney then topped this with a lap turned in 142.894. Both drivers said that this had been easy and that they could trim over two seconds from their lap times if they wanted to try. That night longer gear ratios were installed in all the cars so that their engines would not peak until the end of the course's longest chute. In spite of this Miles, early in the race, on Lap 38, averaged 142.556. Gurney topped this on the next lap by duplicating his record time in practice. At the same time Bruce McLaren , Graham Hill, and Ronnie Bucknam got involved in this race within the Ford family and were commanded from the pits to knock it off or else. They did, and ticked off their laps. By about 10 o'clock Sunday morning (the race would end at 4 P.M.) three Fords were left, and of course they were leading. McLaren was about 38 seconds ahead of second-place Miles and speculation ran through the pits as to just when Milles, old fox that he is, would start closing the gap and make his play for the lead. But orders were to stick to about four minutes per lap and not to race each other. The all-important thing being a Ford victory. And then Miles ripped off a lap in 3 mins, 38 secs and the boom came down. Shelby made it clear to Miles that one repetition of that eagerness would put him on the sidelines for the rest of the race. Miles quipped, If you think Im hard on a car look at whats left of Gurneys. It was impossible to find out where and by whom the decision had been made to rig a dead-heat finish. As for why, pit talk was that the Ford big wheels were angered by Miles' insubordination. Phil Hill was being quizzed on a sports broadcast near the end of the race and the interviewer told him that Shelby had ordered Miles and McLaren to come across the finish line side by side and that the French authorities would decide the Winner. Ridiculous, snapped Hill. I don't think either of us knows what he's talking about. That sort of thing isn't done. Out in the pits they were saying that Ford management wanted Miles, McLaren, and Bucknam, if possible, all to cross the line abreast because it would make such a useful picture. Whatever the background may have been, a drizzle began falling and the cars lapped more and more slowly until on the last lap, Miles and McLaren came past the grandstands at perhaps 50 mph. They were not racing; it was more like a convoy. As they neared the finish line Miles gave his brakes a light touch to keep himself perfectly abreast of McLaren. Some observers said that McLaren blipped his throttle slightly and he did cross the line two or three feet ahead of Miles. McLaren had won the race by a larger margin, even though it was still slight. Both cars had completed 359 laps, but since McLaren's best time in practice had been slower, his starting position was about 30 yards behind Miles'. Thus, he and Chris Amon covered 3007.566 miles versus Miles/Hulme's 3007.546. The Winner's average was 125.3153 mph and that or the second-place car was 125.3147. Miles was easily capable of winning the race. Would he have obeyed the dead-heat orders if he had interpreted the starting-position factor correctly? Did he think, in the heat of the struggle, that his better starting position gave him that much of a lead over McLaren? Mr. and Mrs. Henry Ford II presented their honors to McLaren/Amon and waited patiently for Miles to appear for the toast in champagne which, traditionally, is accorded second-place finishers. Miles did not appear. He left his car where it stood and, tight-lipped and grim, had gone to the seclusion of his hotel room. His plan had been to quit racing after winning Le Mans. This way of concluding the race was obviously contrived, universally unpopular, and lamentable to say the very least. Otherwise, the Ford victory was a popular one, and press and public in Europe tended to react very positively toward it. Having acted as interpreter between one of the Ford equipes and the course officials, I can say that the latter did their utmost to be hospitable, tolerant, and fair. And after the well-earned victory there were no more sour grapes comments about how, with enough millions of dollars, you can do anything. The Fords were downright magnificent, and their obvious quality made the old clichs about money seem pointless. And for Ford and Shelby it had been anything but an easy road. Building cars to win The realization was forced on Ford in 1965 that the 289 race car was not fast enough to win Le Mans. It was decided early in May to build the Mark II version around the Ford 427 engine. An absolute minimum of testing was done, the cars arrived unready to race, and serious problems arose with untested components. Organization was bad due to lack of time and lack of people; there simply was not enough time to build up a racing team capable of handling the three 289s, the two Mark IIs, and the several Cobras. So much time was spent on trying to rectify gearbox troubles in the 289s and Mark IIs that the team did not get in enough practice to show up its latent engine difficulties, and the cars were effectively out of the race before it started. Within a month, Ford gave Shelby the go-ahead on the Mark II program, meaning that there was almost a year in which to assemble the components of the hoped-for victory. This, relatively, was all the time in the world and it permitted, among other things, the buildup and training of what without doubt is (if still intact) the finest racing team in the world today and perhaps in history. This was the scene at Le Mans: Roughly halfway between the city and the course is the huge, modern garage and warehouse of the local Peugeot agent. Shelby had rented half of it. You came around to the back, wondering where to ask for permission to enter, if entry was possible at all. But everything was relaxed and casual and you just walked in. The sight was uniquereminiscent of the Lincoln campaigns in the Mexican Road Race, but more than twice as big. Eight cars, plus a spare. A crated spare engine for each. Spare everything. A few thousand square feet of floor space covered with boxes of spares. About 60 mechanics, all dressed neatly in white and each working methodically, calmly, and competently at his particular job. No haste, no displays of emotion. Roly-poly John Holman cooing to his crew, Easy does it fellas. Just take it nice and easy. Bill Stroppe without a worried frown at last. Shelby rarely around, able to be off in town or at the track, tending to other levels of the effort, having successfully made work the rule that the man to whom you can't delegate responsibility has no place on the team. No buck-passing. What doesn't work gets fixed, now, by willing hands. There are two doctors on duty, if needed. They say. --> Last year this was a madhouse. This year we can hardly get rid of an aspirin. There's no tension, no headaches, even though a lot of them have been working 10 hours a day, seven days a week, for the last 8 1/2 months. Look at them, the race starts tomorrow and they're in such good shape that they have time to spend on just spit polish and making the cars look nice. Somebody sure did a job of picking men. All the Mark IIs were built at Shelby American, where there are the tall Texan himself, wizard of a chief engineer Phil Remington, project manager Al Dowd, project engineer and team manager Carrol Smith, 11 mechanics, a machinist, and a sheetmetal man. Engineering responsibility for the cars is divided between Shelby and various Ford divisions, Ford retaining complete control of design and production of engines, transaxles, and electrical components. Frame, running gear, body and racing management are among the Shelby organization's main responsibilities. It took months to get mutual understanding and lines of communication and supply all running smoothly between Dearborn and the West Coast. But with this early problem resolved, help and decisions became as available as the nearest telephone. Most of the projects trials and problems have been technical ones, the most severe being the development of brakes that were adequate for a car that weighs 2,800 pounds wet, is capable of over 215 mph, and which must run reliably for 24 hours. The brakes consist of Kelsey-Hayes discs with Girling calipers and cylinders, Ford caliper seals and fluid, and Raybestos linings. They were not good enough during the last October tests and were improved. They were better at Daytona, but not good enough. They were still better at Sebring, but not good enough. More work made them still better for Le Mans. As one mechanic put it, Our real problems are weight and speed. If we could lose 400 pounds we'd probably have the best brakes in the world. Come to think of it, that's probably what we have right now. When testing of the Mark II began, brake disc temperatures were running in the 1,600 to 1,700-degree Fahrenheit rangenot Centigrade, as has been reported elsewhere. By Le Mans time the maximum temperature had been reduced to between 1,100 and 1,200 degreesan achievement which took an immense amount of work. One of the key solutions to this problem is the ducting of high-pressure air to the eye of the slotted, ventilated disk, which flings the air out like a centrifugal pump. But it is generally accepted that if this kind of racing continues, everyone will have to adopt aerodynamic brakes, la Mercedes-Benz at Le Mans a decade ago. At the speeds of which these cars are capable, instability due to aerodynamic effects becomes a crucial problem. Last year's 427 GT had an extremely long nose section and it wove disconcertingly at very high speeds. Shelby's crew went to the Ford test track at Kingman, Arizona, with an assortment of nose configurations, and onevery shortprovided uncanny straight-line stability. It enabled the test car to get through the banked curves at Kingman at around 195 mph, and in crosswinds at that. The theory which is used to explain this cut-and-try solution is that suspected front-end hit was not the problem but that the long nose was pushing the car's center of pressure far enough ahead of its center of gravity that it was behaving like a weathervane. The spoiler plate on the Mark II's tail is no gimmick; it is as functional as the transom plate on a drag boat. At Sebring, where the Fords were topping out at around 168 mph, no spoilers were needed to keep the cars glued to the pavement. At Daytona one of the cars was hitting 192 and it took a 1.75-inch spoiler extension to make it manageable at that speed. At Le Mans, where the same machine was topping out in the 205- to 210-mph range, the adjustable spoiler had to be raised an additional full inch to achieve the same road adhesion, the spoiler-area requirement not increasing by simple progression. Although all of the Mark IIs were built as identically as possible, each is subtly different, and each requires a different spoiler-plate setting for a given course. The Shelby crew admits to knowing less about these phenomena than it understands but is getting perfect results, like Ferrari, without fins or front-end spoilers. Sorting out the Mark II's cooling package was a long and complex task since it involved engine, transaxle, brakes, water, oil, and driver. The driver was being roasted in oven-like heat but this was brought under reasonable control (surrounded by all that machinery the driver is never going to be cool) by means of a NACA duct about three inches wide and half an inch deep in a high-pressure area at the front of the nose section. Air from this opening is ducted into the cockpit and out through a louvered plate high at the rear. Another duct provides air for cooling the driver's feet and the entire cockpit is lavishly insulated. The transaxle, with its passenger-car internal parts, gave a great deal of trouble with linkage, lubrication and, particularly, with housing breakage. These problems were the responsibility of Ford's transmission and chassis engineers to solve, and they took considerable time. When testing began there was an impenetrable one-hour barrier to reliability. It was overcome, only to be replaced by a three-hour barrier. Then it was six hours. Then 12. Then 18. And then much more than 24-hour reliability under full racing loads. It is no secret that Ford's racing transaxle research and development is related to future passenger-car projects. The same is true of what is being learned about the Mark II's engine under extreme racing stress. The 427-cubic-inch pushrod V-8, with its forged 180-degree crankshaft and cast-iron heads is a standard production power plant. A profoundly significant fact which all but the very well-informed fail to appreciate when confronted by the displacement figures of Ford and say, Ferrari. But whereas Ferrari built a four-liter, dual overhead-camshaft, hemi chamber light alloy V-12 to meet the Ford challenge, Ford chose to stay as close to stock as reasonably possible. That Ford is capable of doing otherwise is demonstrated by the Indianapolis engine. Basically stock parts of the Mark II 427 include the cylinder block, crankshaft, connecting rods, push-rods, carburetor, all engine accessories, and clutch. The connecting rods were carefully matched, then X-rayed, but are not ground or polished. As many of our readers know, this engine is of the same family as the Ford 332, 352, and 390, a basic cylinder block of immense versatility and with an excellent record in drag racing and stock car racing. The single-overhead camshaft Ford utilizes this same block, crankshaft, and con rod components. When Shelby asked Ford for a rugged powerplant good for about 450 hp, Fords engine engineers proposed the 427, but with the use of special aluminum heads and some magnesium parts for weight reduction. The aluminum heads posed a major problem since they required inserts for the valve seats. These, in the wedge shape chambers with their side-by-side valves, naturally necessitated a reduction in valve diameter. This caused an immediate reduction in the engines power output. This led prompt creation of an engineering research and design program, which led to new breakthroughs at Ford in the design and construction of ports and manifolds, and which in turn resulted in the achievement of air-flow values that are marvelously close to those of the big-valve cast-iron head. These new techniques undoubtedly will be applied to production engines in the future. A dry-sump lubrication system was adopted for reasons of available space and ground clearance, and to provide generous oil capacity. To achieve this, Ford engineering designed a very simple extension of the basic engine's front cover plate, with a chain drive from the crankshaft to a central shaft mounted low on the cover. This shaft drives the three spur gears which make up the scavenge pumps for the front and rear of the sump. The feed pump is conventional, driven off the bottom of the distributor shaft. Most observers are startled to learn that the Mark II runs only a single four-throat carburetora 750 cfm 1-11/16-inch Holley. There are several reasons for this. One, its all thats needed to get the required output, and horsepower is not one of the Mark IIs problems. Two, it provides better part throttle operation, better coming off corners, than available fuel injection or even Webers, which most Americans are unfamiliar with anyway. Three, it gulps less fuel than an eight-throat arrangement and fuel consumption has been one of the bugabears of this project. Four, it keeps it as close as possible to the stock production engine, with the probability that more lessons learned in racing can be applied to the commercial market. The Mark II engine is essentially the NASCAR version of the basic powerplant but with the already mentioned modifications plus a very effective tuned exhaust system, which is hardly feasible in a front engine vehicle. Because of the restriction of the valve diameters, it originally developed the specified 450 SAE-corrected hp, against the NASCAR engines 520 or so. But by Le Mans the Mark IIs were pulling in the neighborhood of 490 hp, although the mechanics were claiming differences of as much as 25 hp in the outputs of the eight cars. These differences are due in part to slight production variations but mostly to the skills of the individual car crews. Ford engineering personnel leaves engine preparation entirely up to the racing mechanics and at Le Mans left them entirely alone, although there always was a factory engineer close by to adverse if called upon. The engineers are acutely aware of the unique expertise of the racing specialists, and report that after each teardown and reassembly there is a palpable increase in power output, just because of the mechanics' increasing knowledge of the engine. It was said that the engine had been put through 48-hour tests before being judged fully ready to contest a 24-hour race. Then they won Daytona's 24 hours, and this seemed to be confirmed. But Daytona is not Le Mans and is quite different. It is much harder on chassis and running gear. Gear changes are about the same in both cases, but Daytona is run about half on a trading throttle while Le Mans is run at full throttle most of the way and therefore is harder on the engine. Ford proved that it was more than equal to both sets of conditions. Driving at Le Mans What was it like driving a Mark II at Le Mans? Before the race Miles said: The car has never been better. Its the most fantastic handling car Ive ever driven. Were close to 125 mph in the early part of Mulsanne and are over that by the time we get to the hook and we can get through it without even lifting; you dont even need all the road! In a curve where at 80 in a normal road machine would be lying on its side, youre doing a nice, comfortable 175. The car is performing impeccably. I dont see why they shouldnt all finish, and finish well. Everyone knew that Ford would win, including the Chaparral people, fresh from an unexpected and splendid victory at the Nrburgring 1000 kilometers. At Le Mans, Hap Sharps was a backyard operation by any standards and by comparison with Fords it was dramatically modest: one car, one spare engine, five mechanics, the drivers, and Sharp himself. The Ring car had done its job and was not entered for Le Mans, awaiting teardown and analysis at Midland. Sharp said before the race: I think our car basically should be quite reliable and that it will finish. However, the odds of any sole car finishing aren't too good, especially when its your first time to prepare one for this race. It was our first time at the Ring too, but the opposition wasn't quite so formidable as here. We won't learn anything about Le Mans by running slowly and trying to finish. We're going to try to finish and try to win. But we're going to run as fast as Hill and Bonnier can go in comfort. We are not consciously going to try to save any part of the car. We're going to try to find out about it. The Chaparral turned a practice lap in 139.904 mph and 140.887 in the race, well under the faster Fords. It seemed to be superior to them in getting through the turns, testifying to Hall and Sharp's mastery of road-holding. On the straights the Fords would sail right past the Chaparral. Sharp admitted to having handling problems, a vague term. Specifically, they seemed to be aerodynamic problems that showed up on Le Mans long straights. Hill and Bonnier would accelerate freely and fast up to a certain high speedsay 180 mph or soand then would seem to be dragged back to hit an invisible wall as the Fords would continue to slip through the air and on to much higher speeds. Sharp learned this much about his car and Le Mans beforeit was claimedthe Chaparrals two small nickel-cadmium batteries failed Saturday night. When the crews of Holman, Moody, Strope, Mann, and Shelby began packing up Sunday afternoon spirits were very low. One reason was the dead-heat finish. Another was the mission and the job was done. What next? Just a Thanks boys. See you later. ? Very possibly, in the light of what Mr. Ford had been saying to the press. He had stated, We think it would be inopportune for us to officially return to the 24 Hours. But the word officially left things wide open and by excluding Le Mans he did not exclude other racing projects. What would the teams like to do for an encore? Nothing more, I think, than tackle Formula 1. That would be a challenge, and they have the organization, talent, confidence, and dedication to do a history-making job. But somebody up there will have to give the OK. /MT   The post How Ford Beat Ferrari at the 1966 24 Hours Of Le Mans appeared first on MotorTrend .